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Whenever we interact with others, we judge them and
whenever we make such judgments, we compare them with
ourselves, other people, or internalized standards.
Countless social psychological experiments have shown
that comparative thinking plays a ubiquitous role in person
perception and social cognition as a whole. The topic of
social comparison has recently aroused the interest of
social neuroscientists, who have begun to investigate its
neural underpinnings. The present article provides an
overview of these neuroimaging and electrophysiological
studies. We discuss recent findings on the consequences of
social comparison on the brain processing of outcomes and
highlight the role of the brain’s reward system. Moreover, we
analyze the relationship between the brain networks
involved in social comparisons and those active during
other forms of cognitive and perceptual comparison. Finally,
we discuss potential future questions that research on
the neural correlates of social comparison could
address. NeuroReport 00:000–000 © 2014 Wolters Kluwer
Health | Lippincott Williams & Wilkins.
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Introduction
Human judgment is by nature comparative. When peo-
ple make evaluations, they do so in relation to a pertinent
norm or standard. To describe oneself as tall, for exam-
ple, implies that one is taller than others. Even such a
basic statement about physical properties is therefore
inherently comparative [1]. Comparisons constitute cen-
tral mechanisms of social judgment and, as a result, stand
at the core of a whole range of social cognitive processes.
Person perception [2–5], stereotyping [6], attitudes [7],
affect [8,9], decision making [10,11], theory of mind [12],
and the concept of self [13,14] all rely on comparative
processes. Over 50 years of psychological research has
shown that social comparisons form one of the corner-
stones of social cognition [15].
One of the reasons that could explain the ubiquity of
social comparisons is that they provide efficient strategies
to make judgments and decisions. By focusing on a
subset of information rather than engaging in an
exhaustive search of one’s knowledge base, social com-
parisons enable humans to save scarce cognitive resour-
ces [16]. This cognitive benefit also shows at the brain
level: during a judgment task, comparative information
processing was associated with smaller changes in alpha-
band activity, suggesting reduced mental effort [17].
In the last few years, neuroscientists have begun to study
the neural correlates of social comparison using functional
neuroimaging and noninvasive electrophysiological
methods. The aim of the present article is to provide an
integrative summary and discussion of this research. Our
review is guided by the two main research lines that
social neuroscientists have pursued so far. In the first part
of this review, we will examine neural evidence sug-
gesting that humans spontaneously rely on social com-
parison when processing information about themselves or
other people. In the second part, we will consider the
potential neural structures supporting this mechanism.
Finally, we will address questions that entail challenges
for future directions such as the connections between the
different systems that play a role in social comparison.
Brain response to objective and relative
outcomes
When looking for happiness and life satisfaction, people
often pursue greater wealth. Reflecting this general
tendency of humans to increase their own wealth, tradi-
tional economic models of decision-making posit that
individual well-being is determined primarily by one’s
absolute income. Real-life observation and experiments
in social environments, however, offer another perspec-
tive. What seems to characterize people’s subjective well-
being is not only how much they own in absolute terms
but also how much they own in comparison with others.
Social psychologists and anthropologists have indeed
shown that social comparisons influence subjective well-
being and behavior [18,19]. Do they also influence brain
processing of outcomes? Social neuroscience has
addressed this question by investigating the influence of
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social comparison on two components of the brain reward
system [20]: the ventral striatum (VS) and the dorsal
anterior cingulate cortex (dACC).
Ventral striatum
The VS constitutes one of the main structures of the
reward system. It encompasses the nucleus accumbens,
the ventromedial parts of the caudate nucleus and puta-
men, the olfactory tubercle, and the lateral olfactory tract
[21]. The VS reacts to both primary (e.g., pleasant tastes)
and secondary rewards (e.g., monetary incentives) and
seems to play a role in the formation of stimulus–reward
association [22]. Ventral striatal activity is influenced by
different kinds of comparisons such as counterfactuals,
temporal comparisons, or expectations [23]. Recently,
several fMRI studies have investigated whether the VS is
also modulated by social comparisons.
These studies have shown that activity in the VS not only
depends on absolute but also on relative rewards. For
example, in Fliessbach et al.’s fMRI study [24], two
participants were simultaneously scanned while per-
forming a simple estimation task (Fig. 1a). Participants’
monetary reward for a given trial depended only on their
own performance and was, thus, unrelated to that of the
other player. At the end of a trial, participants would,
nevertheless, receive a feedback providing information
about both participants’ performance and payment.
Interestingly, when reading this information, participants
seemed to spontaneously engage in social comparison.
Results, indeed, showed that ventral striatal activity fol-
lowing gains was not influenced by the absolute amount
of money earned but by the relative payoff (Fig. 1b). In
other terms, in this experiment, earning 30, 60, or 120
euros did not elicit any significant difference in ventral
striatal activity. What caused VS activity to increase was
to earn more than the other player. Similar results have
been observed by other studies using slightly different
paradigms [25–31] and were found in both female and
male participants [26,28], suggesting that social compar-
ison exerts a strong and reliable effect on the VS.
The relative information represented in the VS may be
used to improve future decisions. To test this hypothesis,
Bault et al. [25] ran a lottery experiment involving more or
less risky decisions. They found that participants
exposed to the performance of another player showed
increased activity in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC)
and other regions involved in the attribution of mental
states to others. This effect was observed even though
participants’ outcomes did not depend on the other
player’s performance. This medial prefrontal activity
seemed to be determined by the rewards obtained pre-
viously: striatal activation while learning about an out-
come predicted mPFC activity when deciding, in the
subsequent trial, which of the two lotteries to choose.
This suggests that when deciding between two lotteries,
participants engaged spontaneously in strategic
competitive reasoning and adjusted their behavior to the
other player’s to obtain higher payoffs. In line with this
hypothesis, behavioral data showed that participants
behaved in a more risk-seeking manner when they
played in a bold environment in which their counterparts
made risky choices. This research thus identifies a net-
work composed of the VS and mPFC that would sustain
the mechanism by which social comparison enables
adjustment of one’s behavior to the behavior of others.
The activity of this network seems, however, to depend
on the possibilities for self-improvement.
Zink et al. [32] have, indeed, observed mPFC activity for
comparisons of social status with superior others, but they
also noticed that the mPFC was only recruited if the
hierarchy was unstable and offered promotion opportu-
nities. In both stable and unstable social hierarchies,
viewing a superior individual recruited perceptual–
attentional, saliency, and cognitive systems. Yet, when
participants had the possibility to improve their social
status, additional regions were engaged related to social
cognition (mPFC) and emotional processing (amygdala).
Social comparison, thus, seems to stimulate self-
improvement by the activity of interconnected motiva-
tional and social neural networks.
Dorsal anterior cingulate cortex
The dACC is another region that plays a key role in the
processing of reward prediction and its errors. The dACC
is an integrative hub connecting affective, cognitive, and
motor brain regions. Its role is to monitor these functions
in potentially conflicting situations, when, for example,
an error has been committed or when outcomes do not
follow expectancies. dACC activity therefore reflects the
subjective evaluation of an outcome and can be used as a
measure of the deviation from the desired outcome. This
function made the dACC a potential target of social
comparison.
In line with this idea, Takahashi et al. [33] suggested that
perceiving a superior other triggers activity in the dACC
and that this activity correlates with envy ratings.
Participants in their study read scenarios describing more
or less enviable persons. When this person was superior
and self-relevant (e.g., a student studying the same major
and having similar lifestyle and hobbies) participants
reported stronger feelings of envy and showed increased
activation in a cluster located at the border between the
dACC and the supplementary motor area, a region
known for its role in the resolution of cognitive conflict.
Moreover, the activation of this area seemed to predict
how participants would react to the misfortune of envied
others. In a subsequent fMRI study involving the same
participants, Takahashi et al. [33] presented descriptions
of misfortunes happening to the protagonists of the first
study (e.g., ‘he was falsely accused of cheating in an
exam’). Learning about the misfortune of envied indivi-
duals triggered a feeling of satisfaction, or schadenfreude,
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(a) Experimental paradigm classically used to study the consequences of social comparison on the ventral striatum. Participants perform a dot-
estimation task at the same time as another player and then receive a feedback about their and the other participant’s performance and monetary
rewards. (b) Activity in the ventral striatum follows relative rewards independent of the absolute payoff. [Values above the chart bars represent the
payoffs in euros of the participant (first value) and the other player (second value)]. ROI, region of interest. Reprinted from Fliessbach et al. [24] with
permission from AAAS. Adaptations are themselves works protected by copyright. So in order to publish this adaptation, authorization must be
obtained both from the owner of the copyright in the original work and from the owner of copyright in the translation or adaptation.
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accompanied by an increased activity of the ventral
striatum. This ventral striatal activity was, in addition,
correlated with the activity observed in the first study
around the dACC and supplementary motor area: the
stronger the dACC activity while thinking about envied
others, the greater the activation of the VS while ima-
gining them in difficult situations. [A recently published
fMRI experiment failed to replicate the results of
Takahashi et al. [33]. Chester et al. [34] used a similar
paradigm as Takahashi et al.’s [33], but in their study,
misfortunes of envied others did not induce any ventral
striatal activation. Instead of the VS, they found a lack of
dorsomedial Prefrontal Cortex (DMPFC) activation for
misfortunes of envied individuals, suggesting that envy
reduces participants’ empathic reactions. The dis-
crepancy between these two fMRI studies is in line with
behavioral studies that found conflicting evidence on the
role of envy in predicting schadenfreude (for a review on
this issue, see Powell et al.[35]).]
The error signal produced by the dACC can be measured
as a negative event-related potential on the scalp. This
feedback-related negativity (FRN) peaks around 300 ms
and is maximal at frontocentral scalp electrode sites [36]
(Fig. 2). The FRN is observed following losses or error
feedback compared with wins or positive feedback, and
can also be induced by positive prediction errors such as
that produced by unexpected omissions of pain [38].
Several event-related potential (ERP) experiments tes-
ted whether the FRN is modulated by social comparison.
ERP experiments investigating the effect of social com-
parison on reward processing reported discrepant results.
In all of these studies, participants performed a simple
task (e.g., an estimation of the number of dots on the
screen) and received a feedback about their performance
and the performance of another player whose reward was
independent from the participant’s reward. Yet, although
these studies rely on similar experimental designs, they
all report different results. Boksem et al. [39] found
enhanced FRN when participants’ own outcomes were
worse than those of others, but neither Wu et al. [40] nor
Qiu et al. [41] replicated these results. What seemed to
matter in these two other experiments was not so much
whether the participant received a higher payoff than the
other player, but rather whether the two players were
equitably rewarded. Surprisingly, however, results of Wu
et al. [40] and Qiu et al. [41] went in opposite directions.
Wu et al. [40] found an equity effect, that is, increased
FRN for equal payoffs compared with unequal ones,
whereas Qiu et al. [41] observed inequity effects, an
enhanced negative component between 350 and 550 ms
and located near the ACC in the inequity conditions.
The explanation for these apparently inconsistent results
may reside in the very nature of the FRN.
The FRN is modulated by several factors that can vary
with slight paradigm changes [37]. For example, the
FRN is sensitive to outcome probability [36]. In Wu
et al.’s experiment [40], equal payoffs had the lowest
probability: the majority of the trials led to unequal
payoffs either because the answer of one of the two
players was incorrect or because two correct trials were
differently rewarded. This may explain why the
researchers observed an enhanced FRN for equity con-
ditions. The FRN is also sensitive to expectations [42,
43]. Qiu et al. [41] reported that their participants
expected their rewards to be the same as the other
player’s when they were both correct, which may explain
why they found a stronger FRN in the inequity condi-
tions as compared with the equity conditions. Finally, the
FRN decreases with perceived task difficulty [44,45].
Thus, it is possible that when the participant was incor-
rect, but the other player was correct, the participant
assumed that the task must have been rather easy and
found their error less forgivable, which in return leads to
an enhanced FRN as reported by Boksem et al. [39]. The
sensitivity of the FRN to these slight paradigm differ-
ences makes it difficult to draw clear conclusions on the
influence of social comparison. It is thus still unclear
whether the FRN and more generally ACC activity are
influenced by social comparisons in the same way as
the VS is.
Conclusion and future research on the brain response to
relative outcomes
Neuroimaging studies provide evidence that the brain
relies on social comparison when processing rewarding
Fig. 2
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The feedback-related negativity peaks around 300ms after negative
feedback. Reprinted from Walsh and Anderson [37] with permission
from Elsevier and Springer. Adaptations are themselves works
protected by copyright. So in order to publish this adaptation,
authorization must be obtained both from the owner of the copyright in
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information. Convergent findings indicate that the VS
reacts to relative rewards. This research shows that the
VS is modulated by social comparison even when parti-
cipants’ outcomes do not depend on the other player.
This suggests that the brain assesses one’s personal
winnings or achievements in comparison with those of
others even when this information is irrelevant to the task
and reward at hand. These results are consistent with the
hypothesis that social comparisons are ‘spontaneous,
effortless, and unintentional reactions to the performance
of others’ ([46], p. 227).
Representation of relative values in the VS influences
subsequent decisions through a connection between the
VS and the mPFC, an area essential for decision making
in social situations. Whether other areas of the reward
system are also modulated by social comparison is,
however, still unclear. The modulation of the dACC by
social comparison still remains to be proven. Experiments
testing the influence of social comparison on the FRN
are inconsistent and their results may be produced by
parameters of the specific experimental paradigms rather
than by an actual effect of social comparison.
To our knowledge, the effect of social comparison on the
processing of negative outcomes has not been investi-
gated so far. Yet, it has been shown that people rely on
social comparisons to cope with difficult situations.
Cancer patients, for example, spontaneously engage in
comparisons with other patients [47]: comparisons with
less fortunate others (i.e., downward comparisons) may
help minimize the severity of one’s situation and can be
used as a strategy to maintain a flattering self-image and
positive feelings [48]. Previous neuroimaging experi-
ments have found that negative outcomes, such as pun-
ishments, involve the lateral orbitofrontal cortex. Future
studies could thus investigate whether the lateral orbi-
tofrontal cortex is modulated by social comparison.
To date, neuroimaging studies have mainly used mone-
tary paradigms to test the influence of social comparison
on the reward system (for exception see Zink et al. [32]).
However, people rely on social comparison to evaluate a
much broader set of situations and qualities than just
money. People do compare their belongings with those of
others, but also their personalities, physical character-
istics, performances, aptitudes, achievements, statuses,
social groups, relationships, emotions, opinions, and
behaviors [49–58]. It is thus essential to also investigate
how comparisons along these different dimensions
influence motivational brain systems.
Mechanisms of social comparisons
Neuroimaging research suggests that reward processing is
highly relative, which is in agreement with social psy-
chological findings that make comparison one of the
central mechanisms of social cognition. Yet, what are the
cerebral processes that enable us to compare ourselves to
other people? Does social comparison rely on the same
brain network as other kinds of comparative judgments or
do they engage specific systems?
Comparative networks
Extensive research in cognitive neuroscience has iden-
tified a network that may be responsible for the repre-
sentation and comparison of a wide range of nonsocial
magnitudes. This network encompasses the intraparietal
sulcus (IPS) as well as areas of the prefrontal cortex [59].
The activity of this network is modulated by a distance
effect: the closer two magnitudes (e.g., two numbers), the
more difficult the comparison and the greater the activity
of this frontoparietal network [60,61]. This network, and
in particular the IPS, is recruited by comparisons of
numbers presented in different formats (e.g., digits,
words), size, dot patterns, line lengths, magnitudes of
angles, luminance, and money rewards [60–67]. Social
neuroscientists have recently begun to investigate its role
in social and person comparisons.
So far, the cerebral mechanisms that enable us to compare
ourselves to others have received the attention of only one
study [68]. In this fMRI experiment, participants were
asked to compare their own height or intelligence with
that of individuals they personally know. Results showed a
greater engagement of the IPS in height comparisons than
intelligence comparisons. Conversely, intelligence com-
parisons recruited to a larger extent the mPFC and other
areas dedicated to the attribution of mental states to oth-
ers. These results can be explained in two ways. They
may reflect differences in the nature of the information
retrieved in memory for the comparison (physical vs.
psychological information) or they may result from differ-
ences in the comparative process itself (for a discussion of
this issue, see Kedia et al. [68]). To decide between these
alternative explanations, one would need to focus on the
comparative process and exclude other perceptual or
inferential mechanisms. To date, this approach has not
been adopted for self–other comparisons, but it has been
applied to other–other comparisons.
One strategy to focus on the comparative process consists
of using noncomparative control conditions. Lindner et al.
[69] relied on this method to investigate the neural net-
works recruited by the comparison of two celebrities’
height (Who is taller: Elvis or Bush?) and intelligence
(Who is more intelligent: Hanks or Einstein?). In addi-
tion to these comparative conditions, the researchers
used two control conditions, in which participants had to
indicate whether one of the two celebrities was a politi-
cian or a musician. This study did not find any activation
in the IPS, but rather showed the activity of a network
composed of the mPFC and other regions important for
social information processing. This network was recruited
by both intelligence and height comparisons compared
with the control conditions, although activations were
stronger for intelligence than height comparisons. This
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led the authors to conclude that person comparisons rely
on different neural comparative systems than compar-
isons of other categories of objects. This study does,
however, entail confounds that would need to be con-
trolled to interpret these results. First, there was no check
to assess whether participants knew the celebrities’
height and intelligence and thus had all necessary infor-
mation to perform the comparisons. Second, the chal-
lenge of using a control condition approach is the choice
of an appropriate control condition. A good control con-
dition should notably have the same level of difficulty as
the conditions of interest, which was not the case in
Lindner et al.’s [69] study, in which response times were
shorter in the control condition than in the comparative
ones. Moreover, the control condition should not involve
any kind of comparison, which is difficult, given that
comparisons are ubiquitous (categorizing a person as a
politician or a musician does involve a comparison
between the target to categorize and the musician and
politician group categories [70,71]). Some have thus
suggested another approach that would enable research-
ers to overcome these limitations.
This other approach makes use of the distance effect, as
commonly done to study magnitude comparison and
numerical cognition. Some social neuroscientists have
indeed reflected that if personal characteristics are simi-
larly represented and compared in the brain as nonsocial
magnitudes, they should elicit similar effects and these
effects should engage the same neural networks. For
example, if person comparisons were to follow a distance
effect, one would expect comparisons of persons close on
a certain characteristic (e.g., of similar attractiveness) to
be more difficult and engage to a greater extent the
frontoparietal network associated with nonsocial com-
parisons. Two articles have already tested this hypothesis
for comparisons of height, attractiveness [72], and social
status [73]. Both studies found behavioral distance effects
and, in both studies, these distance effects engaged the
IPS (Fig. 3). These results suggest that social and non-
social comparisons overlap in the parietal cortex.
The finding that comparisons of personal characteristics
recruit the same comparative network as nonsocial com-
parisons does not, however, imply that different kinds of
judgments engage strictly identical brain regions. The
studies using the distance effect also showed differences
between the compared dimensions. For example, height
comparisons elicited overall more IPS activity than
attractiveness comparisons and attractiveness comparisons
elicited overall greater activity in the fusiform gyrus, a
region of the occipital cortex dedicated to face perception
and recognition [72]. However, the distance effects
remained unaffected by the compared dimension, which
suggests that the comparative process was the same.
A putative model could explain both these similarities
and differences. This model assumes that perceptual and
evaluative processes vary depending on the compared
dimension: facial characteristics such as attractiveness, for
example, would recruit the fusiform gyrus whereas body
dimensions, such as height, may involve the parietal
cortex. This model also assumes that the actual compar-
ison of the extracted magnitudes relies on a common
frontoparietal comparative system (Fig. 4).
This model could be tested by investigating the time
course of comparison processing using ERPs. The model
would then predict differences in early perceptual pro-
cesses (reflected for example by differences in the N170,
the face-sensitive ERP component), but no distance
effect of these neural markers. Previous ERP studies
have observed that the distance effect for numbers –
whether presented in words or Arabic digits – emerges at
around 200 ms after stimulus onset [74]. One could thus
also use electroencephalography to assess whether person
comparisons, which involve more complex stimuli than
numbers, follow a similar time course as numbers or
whether they occur at a later latency.
Conclusion and future research on the underlying
mechanisms
Research on the underlying mechanisms of social com-
parison points to a frontoparietal network also recruited
by nonsocial comparisons. The studies that have identi-
fied this network relied on comparisons of attractiveness,
height, and social status [72,73]. Further investigation is
needed to test whether this frontoparietal system is also
involved in comparisons of complex mental states such as
trustworthiness or intelligence. Future research should
also investigate whether this network is recruited by
spontaneous comparisons, that is, by situations in which
participants compare themselves to others even though
they were not explicitly instructed to do so (see para-
digms described in the first section and Fig. 1a).
On this note, a recent fMRI experiment [75] suggests
that the IPS may be recruited by spontaneous compar-
isons of financial status. Participants of this study were
asked to form an impression of targets with high or low
annual salaries. Results showed that the IPS was modu-
lated by the financial status of the targets even though
participants were not explicitly instructed to evaluate it.
This higher IPS activity for low than for high financial
statuses can be interpreted as a distance effect: partici-
pants may have spontaneously used their own financial
status as a comparison standard to judge those of the
targets, and the fact that participants’ incomes were closer
to the low than to the high financial statuses may have
created an effect of distance. This interpretation is,
however, speculative, given that the study did not actu-
ally measure the distance between participants’ and
targets’ financial situations and its effect on the IPS.
The role of the IPS in spontaneous social comparisons
thus still remains to be determined by more direct
investigations.
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In general, the involvement of the comparative fronto-
parietal network should be tested for a broader range of
self–other comparisons: it is still unclear whether
self–other comparisons involve a distance effect and
whether this distance effect relies on the activity of the
same frontoparietal network as other–other comparisons.
When comparing themselves with others, people show
biases that may influence comparative brain processes.
For example, people have a tendency to overestimate
their qualities and to consider themselves as better than
average [76]. At the brain level, this biased evaluation
occurs with decreased activation of the medial orbito-
frontal cortex (mOFC; see Fig. 5 and Beer and Hughes
[77]). In this context, the mOFC may enable one to
correct one’s initial biased evaluation and shift from one’s
natural response tendency [78–80]. So far, the question of
whether (and how) self-related biases influence compar-
ison processes has not received much attention. Do
self–other comparisons rely on the same frontoparietal
network as other–other and nonsocial comparisons? If so,
Fig. 3
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is this network modulated by self-related brain regions,
such as the mOFC? Or do self–other comparisons rather
engage brain networks that are distinct from those sup-
porting other kinds of comparisons? Future research
should identify the different networks involved in
self–other comparisons and analyze how they interact
with each other.
Future directions
Social comparison constitutes a fundamental social cog-
nitive process and is the focus of one of the major the-
ories in social psychology. This research field has recently
begun to spread out to neuroscience, but many questions
still remain to be explored.
So far, neuroimaging studies on social comparison have
either focused on the influence of social comparison on
the reward system in gaming situations or on the cogni-
tive and neural mechanisms supporting explicit
comparisons. These two research areas have not yet,
however, been linked to each other and the question of
the connection between the comparative and reward
systems still remains to be elucidated. Functional con-
nectivity analyses would be well suited to address this
question [81]. These analyses rely on fMRI data to
characterize the interactions between spatially remote
brain regions and could, thus, be used to explore the
correlation between the comparative and reward brain
systems. This question could also be addressed in the
context of the selective accessibility model [15]. This
social cognitive model posits two ways of comparing
oneself with others. On the one hand, one can seek
similarities between oneself and the comparison standard
and assimilate to this person; on the other hand, one can
focus on the dissimilarities and contrast away from the
standard. These two comparative processes have oppos-
ing consequences. Assimilation to an upward standard
(e.g., former race car driver Niki Lauda) leads to a
Fig. 4
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positive self-evaluation (I have high athletic abilities),
whereas contrast leads to a negative self-evaluation (I
have poor athletic abilities). At the brain level, assimila-
tion and contrast comparison mindsets may reverse the
effect of social comparison on the reward system and
change the sign of social prediction errors. For example,
participants engaging in similarity testing may show
higher levels of ventral striatal activity when exposed to a
more rewarded co-player. This hypothesis remains to be
tested and the effects of similarity and dissimilarity
testing on the comparative and affective systems should
be explored.
The social psychology literature suggests that the
mechanisms underlying social comparison and their
connection to the reward system are likely to be modu-
lated by several factors. The standard chosen for the
comparison is of primary importance [82,83]. In experi-
mental settings, comparison standards have usually been
external persons (e.g., a familiar other, a celebrity, a
confederate, or another participant) but it would also be
interesting to consider internal standards (e.g., ideal, past,
or future selves, societal norms). Comparisons with
internal standards are frequently used in everyday life to
evaluate or motivate oneself and improve one’s perfor-
mance [84,85]. For example, people with chronic medical
problems tend to engage in comparisons with their past
selves and to consider their present condition as better
than it used to be at the beginning of their disease [86]. It
is, however, still unclear whether comparisons with
internal standards recruit the same brain networks as
comparisons with external ones.
Previous research in social psychology has also shown
how the characteristics of the standard influence the
comparison process: people tend to assimilate – rather
than contrast away – to similar, familiar, moderate, and
psychologically close standards as well as to members of
their ingroup [15,87,88]. How these characteristics
influence the comparative and emotional brain systems
would be a question of great interest.
Besides the comparison standard, social comparisons also
depend on personality and cultural influences. Although
the desire to compare oneself to others is universal, some
people are more prone to engage in social comparisons
than others. Individuals high in social comparison orien-
tation (SCO) engage in social comparison more often and
they are also more affected by it [89]. SCO has been
shown to correlate with several other personality
dimensions. People high in SCO tend to be more self-
conscious and show lower self-esteem and higher neu-
roticism [90]. In a similar vein, depressed patients report
an increased proneness to compare oneself with others
[91,92]. Individuals who are prone to social comparisons
are more interested in what others feel and need and
show higher levels of empathy [90]. This suggests that
SCO does not merely reflect a competitive mindset but
rather an interdependent self. It is therefore not sur-
prising that higher SCO has been observed in women
compared with men and in cultures high on inter-
dependence and power distance belief [93]. In accor-
dance with these observations, a recent fMRI experiment
reports that Korean participants (representing an inter-
dependent culture in the study) show a stronger mod-
ulation of the VS by social comparisons than American
participants (representing an independent culture [31]).
On the basis of the general differences in SCO between
men and women, one might also expect a modulation by
Fig. 5
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sex. However, neuroimaging studies investigating the
neural correlates of social comparison have not observed
any significant difference in VS activity between men
and women [26–28]. It is, however, important to note that
all these studies are limited in that they relied on small
samples of participants (between eight and 38 of each
sex) and may lack the statistical power to show significant
differences. Future experiments involving larger samples
should thus clarify whether sex differences in social
comparison behavior are associated with identifiable
neural differences.
Conclusion
All judgments and evaluations are relative in nature and
hence rely on comparisons. Social comparisons are
involved in a wide range of social cognitive processes
spanning from person perception to attitudes and ste-
reotyping. The discovery of the neural correlates of social
comparison would enable researchers to evaluate the role
played by comparison in social cognitive processes and as
a consequence to further elucidate the neural mechan-
isms of social cognition.
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